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POLICE SCIENCE
THE ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPH (EEG) AS EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
EDWIN C. CONRAD
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Journal. He is a fellow in the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and a member of the Ameri-
can Law Institute.-EDITOR.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Durham case' has revived the contro-
versial issue of criminal responsibility. The
proponents of M'Naghten's rule, the right and
wrong test, still maintain that it is scientifically
adequate, founded upon necessity, and dictated
by the experience of mankind.2 Inherent in this
position is the concept that criminal responsibility
is a legal and not a medical problem and that
wholesale acquittals under Durham will endanger
society. On the other hand, Durham, the so
called "product of mental disease" test, to which
has been added in some cases the idea of "irre-
sistible impulse," maintains that insanity is
basically a medical, not a legal problem, that the
M'Naghten rule ignores medical developments
of the past century, and that the "right and wrong"
test should be discarded in favor of the "product
of mental disease" criterion.;
This article will concern itself with proof of
criminal responsibility under any of the pre-
' Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d. 862 (C.A.,
D.C. 1954).
2 See People v. Ricks, 327 P. 2d. 209 (Cal. Apps.
1958); State v. Goza, 317 S.W. 2d. 609 (Mo. 1958).
A very searching analysis of the adequacy of
M'Naghten is contained in the recent case of Sollars v.
State, 316 P. 2d. 917 (Nev. 1957), motion for rehearing
denied 319 P. 2d. 139 (Nev. 1957).
• Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d. 862 (C.A.D.C.
1954); Commonwealth v. Chester, 150 N.E. 2d. 914(Mass., 1958); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, & Amer.
Rep. 533 (1869).
New Hampshire was the first state to be influenced
by the teaching of Dr. Isaac Ray, the eminent English
psychiatrist, that insanity is a medical problem. As
early as 1869 New Hampshire abandoned the
M'Naghten rule and in its stead introduced the concept
that an accused is not to be held criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the result of mental disease or
defect. Under the New Hampshire rule, insanity is not
defined as a matter of law but in effect is made a
question of fact to be determined by the jury as any
other fact would be determined.
vailing tests by the use of electroencephalographic
studies.
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE ELECTRO-
ENCEPHALOGRAPH
The electroencephalograph, hereinafter referred
to as EEG, is a modern scientific, medical instru-
ment which records the brain wave patterns of
individuals.
While the EEG was developed after 1929,
Galvani, the Italian scientist, as early as 1790,
demonstrated that: (1) contraction of muscles will
occur on electrical stimulation; (2) during a
contraction of a muscle by use of external force,
an electric current is generated. 4 Later in 1875,
Caton in England was able to show that the
exposed brain of a rabbit produced electrical
disturbances, which could be graphed and re-
corded., However, while there was some work
along these lines, it was not until 1924 that Hans
Berger, a German psychiatrist, visualized the
process of recording brain waves and using the
records obtained to analyze specific psychiatric
problems. Berger's publications on the subject,
beginning in 1929 and ending in 1939, have earned
for him the title of father of electroencephalog-
raphy.1
I GALVANI, L.: De Viribus Electricitatis in Moto
Musculari Commentarius. MEMOIRS OF THE INSTITUTE
OF SCIENCES. Vol. 7, p. 1791, Bologna, Italy.
5 CATON, R.: The Electric Currents of the Brain.
BRIT. MED. J., Vol. 2., p. 278, 1875. CATON. R.: Re-
searches on Electrical Phenomena of Cerebral Gray
Matter. TR. INTERN. MED. CONGRESS, 9th Session,
Section VIII. (Physiology), Washington, D. C., Vol.
III, pp. 246-249.
6 See BERGER, H.: Uber das Elektrenkephalogramm
des Menschen. ARCH. F. PSyciLAT. Vol. 87, pp. 527-
570, 1929.
See also SCHWAB, ROBERT S., ELECTROENCEPHALOG-




Electroencephalograph in operation. The 8 brain wave patterns are visible on the graph. (Courtesy, Edin,
Worcester, Mass.)
THE BRAIN WAVE RECORDER
The EEG is an apparatus for making graphic
records of the actual electric potentials of the
human cerebrum. Two or more electrodes con-
nected to the instrument are placed on different
parts of the skull or scalp. The difference in poten-
tial brought about by electrical action within the
brain is traced by styluses writing with ink on a
continuous paper strip. The EEG is a rather com-
plex electronic instrument, an integral part of
which is a powerful amplification system necessary
to record the small voltages occurring across the
electrodes placed on the skull. (See figure 1). In
essence the EEG records both the cyclical activity
and amplitude of brain wave patterns of the human
being. In other words, the EEG records perma-
nently and in readable form the electrical oscilla-
tions of the brain due to the electrical activity of
the cortical cells.
A study such as this can only skim the surface
with respect to the subject of brain wave patterns
and their significance. Medical men, however,
will agree that in general a normal brain wave
pattern in human beings is discernible and that
all other patterns are considered abnormal. By
way of illustration, Gibbs teaches us that the
rhythmic activity of the cortex of the brain ranges
from below 1 cycle per second to above 100 cycles
per second, and the voltage range is from I micro-
volt (one millionth of a volt) to 1000 microvolts.
Adult normal persons will show a frequency range
of 8Y2 to 12 cycles per second and a voltage range
from 5 to 50 microvolts; also many types of in-
jury to the brain, such as trauma and infection,
will slow or speed up the electrical activity of the
cortex.7 According to the Gibbs classification, an
EEG with a dominant 8%/ to 12 cycles per second
7 GIBBs, F. A. AND ERNA, L., ATLAS OF ELECTRO-
ENCEPHALOGRAPHY, VOl. 1, pp. 70, 106, Ch. 10, What is




activity and no abnormal slow or fast activity is
classified as normal for adults, all others being
abnormal. At the other extreme, organic damage to
the brain will slow cortical activity, and a slow or
very fast EEG suggests an epileptic diathesis or
an organic brain disorder., The dart or spike and
dome configurations of the brain wave pattern with
increased activity in cycles per second is quite
characteristic of certain types of epilepsy. 9 (For
characteristic brain wave patterns, see figure 2).
Obviously, what is a normal EEG depends on a
great number of factors, beyond the reach of this
article. That many variables will affect the results
as recorded by the EEG is obvious. The observa-
tions of Gibbs on brain wave patterns are illumi-
nating:
1. A normal EEG is presumptive but not posi-
tive evidence of normality.
2. A slight abnormally slow or fast EEG is by
itself not significant but adds support to
other evidence of an epileptic diathesis or
an organic brain disorder.
3. A very slow or exceedingly slow EEG as well
as a very fast or exceedingly fast EEG sug-
gests an epileptic diathesis or an organic
brain disorder.'0
Brain wave patterns will be influenced by the
following EEG parameters or factors:
1. Age.
2. Level of consciousness (whether asleep,
awake, relaxed, attentive).
3. Brain metabolism.
4. The clinical symptomatology of epilepsy
and related brain disorder (trauma, en-
cephalitis, vascular disease).
5. Pharmacological action of stimulants, seda-
tives and anti-epileptic substances."
These variables do suggest certain limitations
which must be considered in interpreting any EEG
studies.
In passing it should be noted that the American
Medical Association and the American Electro-
encephalographic Society have adopted minimum
standards and specifications for acceptable EEG
instruments.u These are set forth in the Gibb's
book and should be thoroughly studied before
considering the presentation of EEG evidence.
SIbid., Vol. 1, pp. 70, 106.
9GRAY, ROSCOE N., ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF
MIIEDICINE, Vol. 1, pp. 1033-1036, (NM. Bender & Co.,
Albany, N.Y., 1951).
"I Gibbs, op. cit., Note 7, supra, Vol. 1, p. 110.
I Gibbs, op. cit., Note 7. supra, Vol. 1, pp. 79-80.12 Gibbs, op. cit., Note 7, supra, Vol. 1, pp. 126-136.





A diagrammatic illustration of various types of brain
waves as recorded on EEG tracings, the x or horizontal
axis being the time base and the y or vertical axis the
amplitude of the wave. (1) and (2) represent normal
alpha 9-11 c/s rhythm. (3) and (4) demonstrate vari-
ous types of "slow waves" from 3 c/s to 6 c/s, the
type of cerebral dysrhythmia seen after cerebral con-
cussion. (5) represents the isolated "spike" found as
a sign of focal irritation of the underlying cortex.
(6) represents a seizure discharge. Source: GORDY,
DR. LouisF, Concussion of the Brain, AwERCAN
BAR AssN., 1955 PROCEEDINGS, Section of Insurance
Law, pp. 437, 463.
LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF THE EEG
The science of electroencephalography is still
in its early stages of development, and therefore,
it may take the medical man many years more to
fathom the meaning of the various brain wave
patterns. At the present time the EEG can only
be regarded as a diagnostic aid to be used along
with the history of the patient and other scientific
tools. In itself it cannot replace adequate clinical
examinations. In other words, can EEGs only be
interpreted with the aid of case histories and clini-
cal findings.'3 As Gray points out, aside from the
dart and dome of epilepsy, the EEG serves in
13Belgium Correspondent. Symposium, Belgium
Society of Mental and Legal Medicine and Neurology,




confirmation of other studies, but will not in itself
permit diagnostic conclusions; moreover, the EEG
is not positively diagnostic of epilepsy.1 4
In a sense, every individual has a unique EEG
of his own.15 Thus, abnormal waves may be found
in normal individuals, and normal waves may even
be found in epileptics. 16 Many demented patients
have a normal EEG.17 Consequently, it is ex-
tremely difficult to define a normal EEG. Under
present techniques two examiners investigating
the same subject may come up with different con-
clusions. Of course, "the greatest care is necessary
in the interpretation of tracings and the practical
conclusions which can be derived from them". 8
While legal medicine can profit presently from
the use of the EEG, the following preliminary
considerations affecting its use must still be re-
solved:
1. Standardization of the technique of record-
ing.
2. A clear definition of the normal rhythm and
its alterations.
3. Knowledge of the metabolic factors which
control cerebral rhythm.
4. A consideration, on the basis of extensive
statistics, of the percentage of normal and
abnormal tracings in disorders pertaining to
legal medicine."9
The lack of definite standards with respect to
these four points is an important objection to the
use of the EEG and has led to the charge that in-
terpretation of such graphs is a matter of individual
uncontrolled judgment rather than scientific cer-
tainty. As a matter of fact, the accuracy of meas-
urements on the EEG depends largely on the re-
corder's skill, care, and knowledge of the various
variables involved, including the particular posi-
tion of the electrodes with respect to the lines of
force in the electric field. Therefore, any absolute
measurements of voltage on the EEG are nearly
impossible.2 0
'4 Gray, op. cit., Note 9, supra, Vol. 1, pp. 1031-
1041.
15 Gibbs, op. cit., Note 7, supra, Vol. 1, p. 106.
16 Gray, op. cit., Note 9, supra, Vol. 1, pp. 1033-
1035.
17 HILL, DENIS, ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY, p. 360
(McMillan Co., N.Y., 1950).
18 Paris Correspondent, Application of Electroenceph-
alograph in Legal Medicine, JOURN. Am. MED. ASS'N.,
Vol. 129, Dec. 27, 1945, p. 1220.
19 Observations of A. Boudoin and Fischgold, 64th
Congress of French Ass'n for the Advancement of
Science, Paris Correspondent, JOURN. Am. MED. ASS'N.,
Vol. 129, Dec. 22, 1945, p. 1220.
20 Schwab, op. cit., Note 6, supra, pp. 22-23.
Medical authorities are in general agreement
that the EEG serves a very useful function in de-
termining organic brain damage and certain forms
of epilepsy.2' But there is a disagreement as to
whether the EEG can detect functiomal disorders.
One school of thought in the medical field has
claimed some degree of correlation between the
abnormal EEG and the functional disorder of the
human being.2 A review of the medical literature
indicates that most medical authorities shy away
from any conclusion that the EEG will reveal
functional, as distinguished from organic, disorder
in the individual. Rowntree has characterized this
viewpoint in these words:
"Electroencephalography is of value in the
diagnosis and localization of space occupying
brain lesions, in the diagnosis and classification
of epilepsy, and in the localization and progno-
sis of head injuries. It is of some value in certain
organic diseases of the nervous system, mainly
as an index of cortical involvement, in the diag-
nosis of mental diseases with an organic basis,
in medicolegal cases and in the diagnosis of
barbiturate intoxication. It is of little value in
differential diagnosis of functional nervous and
mental disorders, does not indicate loss of brain
tissue and is not a measure of intelligence.
Electroencephalography is just another lab-
oratory procedure and should be regarded as
skeptically as any other test in which results
depend on machine, technician, and inter-
preter." 3
Hughes confirms this thinking:
"While the usefulness of electroencephalog-
21 HUGHES, JOSEPH, Electroencephalography, Am.
JOURN. OF PSYCHIATY, Vol. 105, Feb. 1949, p. 627.
2"The frequent finding of abnormal cortical rhythms
in psychopaths and behavior disorders generally sug-
gested that direct evidence ot abnormal brain function
in criminals might be obtained by electroencephalog-
raphy." HILL, DENIS, ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY, p.
350 (McMillan Co., N.Y., 1950).
Sol Levy and Margaret Kennard, examining 100
prisoners, found that 30% of the EEG records of such
prisoners showed abnormal EEG's as compared to
5-10% usually found in the normal population. LEvy,
SOL, and KENNARD, MARGARET, A Study of the Elec-
troencephalogram, as Related to Personality Structure
in a Group of Inmates of a State Penitentiary, Vol. 109,
Am. JOURN. PSVCHIAT., April 1953, pp. 832-839.
For similar studies, see: HEUYER, G., NEKHOROCHEF,
I., and LELoRD, G., Semaine Hop., Paris, Vol. 33, pp.
211-220, Jan. 20, 1957. Abstract. JouRN. Am. MED.
AsS'N., Vol. 163, Ap. 27, 1957, p. 1652.
23 ROWNTREE, D. W., Clinical Uses of Electro-
encephalography, Vol. 50, N. ZEALAND MED. JOURNAL,
Oct., 1951, pp. 433-536. Abstract, Vol. 148, JoURN.
AMER. MED. ASS'N., Ap. 5, 1952, p. 1255.
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raphy in the fields of organic mental disease is
acknowledged, there is, as yet, no convincing
evidence of specific EEG abnormalities in func-
tional psychiatry disorders, nor is there any
evidence that the incidence of EEG variability
is any greater in patients with such disorders
than in the general population despite the nu-
merous reports in the literature to the contrary.
These divergent views in the EEG literature
are not only confusing but indicate a pressing
need for all workers to agree on accepted normal
EEG controls against which to check their re-
spective findings." 24
Fetterman and Victoroff have concluded:
"The EEG has taken its place with the ECG
(electrocardiograph) and other devices as a re-
search and diagnostic instrument. Properly in-
tegrated with other clinical laboratory and
survey procedures, it can help in removal of
persons from jobs they should not hold, evaluate
mental capacity following a brain injury, detect
latent cortical seizure states such as epilepsy,
estimate the effect of environment and toxic
agents on cerebral function and separate some
hysterical from organic disorders. In medicolegal
cases it is of special value in the determination
of mental capacity in testamentary cases, culpa-
bility in criminal cases, latent and actual cere-
bral damage in compensation cases and malin-
gering in litigation claiming loss of vision,
hearing or tactile sensation." 25
THE EARLY USE OF THrE EEG
IN ENGLISH CASES
The use of the EEG in criminal cases to prove
or disprove the sanity of an accused was a logical
development arising out of the studies and demon-
strations of Hans Berger. However, as pointed out
by Gray:
"The study of criminals is among the most
24 HUGHES, JOSEPH, Electroencephalography, Vol.
105, AmER, JoURN. OF PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1949, pp. 627-
628.
There is no rigid overall relation between the EEG
and personality. Gibbs, op. cit., Note 7, supra, Vol. 1,
p. 78.
The EEG has no absolute value in differentiating the
responsible from the irresponsible, Paris Correspondent.
Observations of Titeca, Symposium, Belgium Society of
Legal Medicine, and Neurology. Vol. 155, JotURN. Am.
IED. Ass'N., July 31, 1954, p. 1273.2
5 FE -RESAN, J. L. and VIcToRoFF, V. M., Indus-
trial and Forensic Applications of Electroencephalog-
raphy, Vol. 4, A.M.A. ARCH. INDUST. HYG. AND
OCCUP. MED., July, 1951, p. 10. Abstract in Vol. 147,
JOuRN. AmER. MED. Ass'N., Oct. 13, 1951, p. 687.
difficult of all problems presented to the medical
profession. While normal electroencephalograms
do not conclusively demonstrate that disease
processes such as epilepsy are absent, the pres-
ence of waves and spikes is strongly indicative
of petit mal attacks. Marked abnormalities of
almost any type indicate other psychoses. Crime
may have been committed during periods of
temporary insanity, but less frequently than
alleged.
"Criminals frequently claim amnesia, tem-
porary loss of memory. It is most difficult
through clinical examination to determine if
the usual cause, epilepsy, is present. To wait
for a seizure which may be very long postponed
is most unsatisfactory. A normal electroen-
cephalogram casts serious doubt upon the allega-
tion. A record of neuronic discharge indicative of
epilepsy may prevent the miscarriage of
justice. 2 16
Three English cases, all decided in trial courts,
illustrate the early use of the EEG in the deter-
mination of criminal responsibility. An English
soldier, who had fired a rifle at a corporal, claimed
that he had no knowledge of the affair and suffered
a head injury a few hours previously. Apparently,
the attack was without motive. An EEG showed
abnormalities compatible with head injuries, and
the soldier was discharged. In another case a brutal
and apparently purposeless murder was com-
mitted. The accused claimed that the act was per-
formed in a period of postepileptic confusion. The
evidence of epilepsy was tenuous, but an abnormal
EEG was produced. The medical expert testified
that an absolute diagnosis of epilepsy could not be
made on this evidence, as no subclinical attacks
were seen, but he concluded that the EEG made
the diagnosis of epilepsy likely. The accused was
found "Guilty but insane",27 and so escaped capital
punishment.H
In another case, a 20 year old student was
charged with the murder of his mother. Prior to
the time he had killed her, he had drunk 4 pints of
beer. He had no recollection of the killing. Two
medical men gave him the same quantity of mild
beer and upon examination, they found that the
accused's blood sugar content was lowered when
26 Gray, op. cit., Note 9, supra, Vol. 1, p. 1040.
2 This is the orthodox finding in English courts
where the defendant has been found insane.
2 London Correspondent. The EEG in Criminal
Trials, JouRN. AMER. MED. ASS'N., Vol. 121, Jan. 2,
1943, p. 64.
EDWIN C. CONo4D
tested with the EEG while under the influence of
this beer; the results indicated that the brain waves
were erratic and definitely abnormal. The jury,
studying the EEG, was apparently influenced by
its findings and found the accused "guilty but in-
sane'.29
No English appellate case, dealing with the ad-
missibility of EEG records in proof of criminal re-
sponsibility, has been discovered. In the United
States in personal injury cases the EEG has been
used rather extensively to prove brain damage.30
While-no reliable source of information seems to be
available, the ensuing examination of American
appellate decisions indicates that EEG records
are used in trial of civil cases on the issue of brain
damage and in the trial of criminal cases on the
issue of criminal responsibility. Appellate courts
have recognized the EEG as valid scientific proof
within the rule of the Frye case,3' the polestar which
guides the bench and the bar in considering the
admissibility of scientific proof.
• CONSIDERATIONS OF COMPETENCY
In considering the admissibility of scientific
evidence in general, the New York Court of Ap-
peals in People v. Magri2 recently stated:
"Almost daily reproductions by photography
... x-rays, electroencephalograms, electrocardio-
grams, speedometer readings, time by watches
and clocks, identity by finger printing, and bal-
listics evidence, among a variety of kindred
scientific methods, are freely accepted in our
courts for their general reliability, without the
necessity of offering expert testimony as to the
scientific principles underlying them". (Empha-
sis added.)n
This, in effect, says that the court will take
judicial notice of the working principles of the
9 London Correspondent. The EEG as Evidence of
Criminal Responsibility, JOURN. AMER. MED. ASS'N.,
Vol. 122, May 15, 1943, p. 190.
30 GORDY, DR. LoUIsE J., Concussion of the Brain,
1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Section on Insurance, p. 454. MUNDY-CASTLE, A. C.,
Electroencephalography and Forensic Medicine, JouRN.
oF FORENSIC MEDICINE, Vol. 2, Ap.-June, 1955, p. 95.
3' Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F.
1013, 34 A.L.R. 145 (1923).
See also GIBBS, F. A., Medicolegal Aspects of Electro-
encephalography, CANADIAN BAR REVIEW, Vol. 24, p.
359-388 (1946).
2 3 N.Y. 2d. 562, *566, 147 N.E. 2d. 728, 170 N.Y.S.
2d. 335, *338 (1958).
33 This principle has been repeated several times
subsequently: People v. Jones, 10 Misc. 2d. 1067, 171
N.Y.S. 2d. 325 (1958); People v. Duskin, 11 Misc. 2d.
945, 174 N.Y.S. 2d. 527 (1958); People v. Pett, 178
N.Y.S. 2d. 550 (1958).
EEG and that no testimony of an expert nature is
necessary to establish its general reliability and the
scientific principles underlying the use of the EEG.
This is indeed a very liberal approach to a rather
complex problem.
Use in Civil Cases: Practically all of the cases
examined related to the use of the EEG to prove
brain damage either in a personal injury suit or a
workmen's compensation proceeding. The holdings
in these cases will give us a pretty fair idea as to the
evidential worth of the EEG as an instrumentality
of proof.
The case of Egelston v. Industrial Commission of
Arizona3' involved a situation in which a claimant,
seeking compensation for head injuries, introduced
the results of a pneumoencephalogram, which is
essentially an x-ray of the skull and brain, after
removal of spinal fluid from the brain. The results
showed some injury to the brain, according to one
medical witness, but the Industrial Commission
refused to make an award to claimant on the basis
of what it considered doubtful evidence. More-
over, the Supreme Court held that it was not error
for the Commission to deny claimant's request for
another similar test at the expense of the Com-
mission. In the pneumoencephalograph, damage
to the brain is ascertained by reading various
shadows appearing on the x-ray of the brain
whereas in the EEG, no x-ray is involved, the EEG
brain wave patterns furnishing the scientific
clue as to cerebral injury. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant in the study of our problem, to bear in
mind that the pneumoencephalograph method is
available, although it does involve a painful op-
eration, which the EEG does not.
35
The first case on the appellate level.dealing with
the admissibility of an EEG is Mayole v. B. Crystal
& Son, Inc.,36 decided in 1943, about four years
after Berger's written contributions had come to an
end. Plaintiff had sued defendant to recover dam-
ages sustained as a consequence of plaster falling
upon the plaintiff while he was in a loft building
owned by defendant. The New York Supreme
52 Ariz. 276, 80 P. 2d. 689 (1938).
In Cole v. Town of Miami, 52 Ariz. 488, 83 P. 2d.
997 (1938), a workman's compensation applicant
claimed a permanent damage, including a possible
Jacksonian epilepsy, all as the result of a fall. The com-
mission ordered claimant to submit to a pneumo-
encephalogram. Claimant declined to take such test. It
was held that the necessity for taking such test was up
to the commission, unless it appeared that such test
would greatly endanger the life or health of the plaintiff,
without any reasonable prospect of securing information
material to the claim.36 266 App. Div. 1008, 44 N.Y.S. 2d. 411 (1943).
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Court, Appellate Division, Second Department,
held, without discussion, that:
"The (trial) court committed (prejudicial)
error in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's
medical witness as to the condition or conditions
for which the electroencephalograph was a test.
It was also error to exclude the electroencephalo-
gram and the records respecting it made in the
ordinary course of business. E374-a, Civil Prac-
tice Act. .. "
Betz v. Travelers Ins. Co.,- is a good illustra-
tion of the use of the EEG to prove brain
damage in workmen's compensation proceedings.
Applicant had been given an award as a conse-
quence of an explosion on the employer's premises,
which explosion caused plaintiff's head to be
thrown against the ground. Applicant was not
satisfied with the award, and subsequent to this
determination Dr. P. examined applicant by
means of an EEG, found abnormalities present,
and concluded that the EEG was strongly sugges-
tive of localized brain damage. Dr. K., basing his
conclusion on the EEG, found that applicant had
suffered some injury to the brain. The Court of
Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, remanded the
case to the District Court to allow the plaintiff to
take the testimony of Drs. P. and K. as to such
EEG for the purpose of'showing whether plaintiff
suffered any brain damage, reserving to defendant
the right to introduce similar evidence.39
Snyder v. Jensen0 also involved a personal injury
case. Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile
and sued the host driver for a permanent brain
damage. Plaintiff's medical witness, Dr. M., as
part of his medical examination, ordered an EEG.
This was done under his direction at Washington
University School of Medicine, St. Louis, the
doctor being in charge of the department of neu-
rology and psychiatry. Dr. M. interpreted the EEG
graphs and made a finding indicating a disorder of
V Ibid., N.Y.S. 2d cit., p. 412. In Accord: People
v. Jones, 171 N.Y.S. 2d. 325,* 330 (1958); Wheeler
v. United States, 211 F. 2d. 19 (C.A.D.C. 1958).
"s 68 So. 2d. 666 (La. App. 1953).
' On a remand, the District Court reaffirmed the
original award after listening to the additional testimony
by Drs. P. and K., for the plaintiff, and Dr. K., for
defendant. On appeal by plaintiff, this judgment was
affirmed: Betz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 82 So. 2d. 379
(La. App. 1955). The Court of Appeal of Louisiana,
First Circuit, emphasizes the point that while the EEG
may demonstrate the exact locality of irritative lesions,
confirmatory objective symptoms permit determina-
tion more accurately and that the EEG has not estab-
lished a new method of sufficient certainty to replace
careful clinical observations.
40 281 S.W. 2d. 802 (Mo. 1955).
the brain, which he took into account in concluding
that there was permanent brain damage; he also
found that the pattern is different when the brain
is diseased as compared to a normal pattern. De-
fendant objected on the ground of hearsay. The
Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that (1)
there was sufficient identification and authentica-
tion of the EEG since it was made at his request
and direction while he was head of the department
and (2) the doctor could base his opinion on the
EEG as well as other evidence in the case. *R
In Melford v. Gaus and "Brown Construction
Co.,4 an almost parallel situation, plaintiff, a
minor, struck his head on a heavy plank on the
ground. It was contended that plaintiff sustained
permanent brain damage. Three EEGs of plain-
tiff were made by Dr. F. A. Gibbs, a renowned ex-
pert and author in electroencephalography;43 all
the EEG tests bore notations identifying them as
ones taken of the plaintiff. Dr. Gibbs, at the trial,
testified that when the tests are made he sets up
prescribed conditions which give objective findings
when extraneous radiation disturbances and pa-
tient disturbances are held to a minimum; that the
particular tests are made when the patient is
asleep and this was true of the plaintiff; that the
tests were made by a technician under the direction
of Dr. Gibbs. There was also testimony that ex-
perts can tell from examining the tracings whether
the results of a given test are valid.
The Illinois court held that the testimony of
Dr. Gibbs justified the inference that the machine
was properly calibrated and in proper functional
order and that the graphs were made under com-
petent technical care. The court also rejected the
argument that the technician who made the EEGs
should be produced in view of the fact that Dr.
Gibbs himself authenticated such documentary
proof. The court also held that another neurologist,
in answer to a hypothetical question, including the
testimony of Dr. Gibbs that the EEG showed per-
manent brain damage, could testify that there
was brain damage. A reading of the opinion
indicates that the court was impressed by such
testimony and affirmed the award in favor of the
plaintiff.
The necessity for calling a neurosurgeon in addi-
It See also Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Tucker, 262 Ala. 570, 80 So. 2d. 288 (1955), in which an
award of $50,000.00 for permanent brain injury was
upheld on the basis of EEG and other evidence in the
case.
42 151 N.E. 2d. 128 (Ill. Apps. 1958).
13 Dr. Gibbs is the coauthor of the most compre-
hensive work on the EEG; see Note 7, supra.
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tion to an EEG expert was recently considered by
the Texas Civil Appeals Court in Lantex Construc-
tion Co., v. Lesjal." The case involves a typical
brain injury situation, plaintiff striking his head
after he fell off a scaffold, into which defendant's
truck had run. A Professor P., an expert at making
an electrical diagnostic test on an EEG,4 5 testified
that he made such test on the plaintiff and that it
reflected brain damage. He also stated that he was
not a neurosurgeon and could not say what might
have caused the brain damage. The EEG testi-
mony was admitted. Plaintiff had intended to put
on a neurosurgeon, but never got around to it.
However, a medical doctor on behalf of plaintiff
did testify that as a result of the fall plaintiff was
rendered unconscious, that he did foam at the
mouth; that he remained unconscious for six hours;
that as a result of the accident plaintiff suffered
from headaches and loss of memory and that he
did have a brain concussion. The Texas court, in
upholding the right to have the EEG received in
evidence on the theory that the EEG findings were
compatible with the doctor's observations, -con-
cluded:
"Consequently, the electroencephalogram
having been identified as that of the plaintiff
and offered by a competent witness, and there
being supporting testimony that plaintiff had
sustained a concussion in the fall, the jury were
entitled to consider the testimony."
46
An analysis of these decisions would seem to in-
dicate a rather liberal attitude on the part of the
courts in admitting the results of EEG tests in
civil cases. Will the same principles apply in crim-
inal cases on the issue of criminal responsibility?
Use in Criminal Cases: The admissibility of the
EEG on the issue of criminal responsibility was
considered for the first time by an appellate court
in State v. Shiren,47 decided in 1951. The accused
was indicted and convicted of an assault and
battery and causing death by reckless driving of an
automobile. The state contended the defendant
was intoxicated. The accused's defense was illness,
which caused him to "black out", and defendant
offered to prove that his doctor performed an EEG
on him; that an EEG discloses any abnormalities
in brain wave pattern and ordinarily will reveal
whether one has suffered a stroke depending upon
- 315 S.W. 2d- 177 (1958).
45 The opinion does not indicate whether the expert
was a medical doctor.
46 Ibid., S.W. 2d. cit., p. 184.
4 15 N.J. Super. 440, 83 A. '2d. 620 (1951).
the part of the brain wave involved; that defend-
ant's doctor had obtained EEG results which
would indicate a brain disease. The trial court re-
jected such offer of proof. The Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that the
exclusion of the offered medical testimony as to the
results of the EEG was erroneous and affected
defendant's substantial rights.
From the standpoint of criminal responsibility,
State v. Piggle,48 is important. In a Wyoming pros-
ecution for murder, defendant entered a plea of
insanity. Pursuant to the statute, the court di-
rected defendant to be taken to the state hospital
for mental examination. He was subsequently
taken to the office of Dr. P., a neurologist and
neurosurgeon, Salt Lake City, Utah, where Dr. P.
took an EEG of the accused while the latter was
awake. There were no facilities for taking an EEG
in Wyoming at that time. Dr. P. testified that the
test showed no abnormality. He admitted that the
test was better while the patient was asleep, but
he concluded that taking the test while the accused
was awake made no difference in this case. The
appropriate hypothetical question put to the doc-
tor included the findings of the EEG. The doctor
concluded the accused was sane.
Defendant objected to the EEG test on the
ground that it should have been given while he was
asleep, but the court held there was sufficient
evidence beside the EEG to warrant a conviction.
As to defendant's complaint that he should not
have been taken out of the state for the purpose of
taking the EEG, the Wyoming court held that de-
fendant's lack of objection to the EEG test was a
waiver and that the test was actually taken for the
benefit of defendant. The court also held that
such taking of the test did not violate the Fifth
Amendment, and that the physician-patient privi-
lege did not apply because the doctor was not
accused's physician.
This case sustained the use of the BEG to prove
that the defendant was sane, although experts for
both the state and defendant relied on EEG find-
ings.
Although the authorities in the criminal field
11298 P. 2d. 349 (Wy. 1956), rehearing denied 300 P.
2d. 567 (Wy. 1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 981, 77 S. Ct.
384, 1 L. Ed. 2d. 366 (1957).
In the recent case of State v. Goza, 317 S.W. 2d.
609 (Mo. 1958) both the state and defense experts relied
on EEG tests. Defendant was convicted. The Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed without discussing the
evidential aspects of the EEG, although it refused to
accept as conclusive the defense medical testimony that
the EEG showed brain damage.
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are few in number, one can conclude that the EEG
has been accepted as a scientific instrumentality
of proof on the issue of criminal responsibility.
Obviously, in considering the admissibility of an
EEG in a particular case, the court must consider
the limitations of the EEG. If they are substantial,
then the evidence is incompetent; if trivial or of
minor consequence, the courts will undoubtedly
admit the evidence and instruct the jury that the
limiting factors may affect the weight of such proof.
The writer's general conclusions with respect
to the use of the EEG have been supported by a
very recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the case of State v. Carlson.49 Carlson had
been convicted of arson and third degree murder,
as the result of the arson. Carlson's plea in each
case was not guilty by reason of insanity. The
arson and murder cases were tried together. The
defendant, while awaiting trial, was tested at his
own request by means of an EEG. At the trial Dr.
D., who took the test, was called as a witnesson
behalf of the defendant.
Upon objection by the state to any testimony by
Dr. D. as to the results and interpretations of the
test, defendant, in the absence of the jury, offered
to prove that Dr. D. did make the test; that Dr. D.
made an interpretation of the test; that the EEG
pattern showed a brain abnormality that was
probably of organic origin, resulting from brain
trauma; that Dr. D. could not state from her
findings that the defendant did not know the differ-
ence between right and wrong; that the findings
did not indicate any mental disease in Carlson;
that disturbances of the type she found in Carlson
are found in individuals who have an organic con-
dition acquired early in life from one of several
causes plus emotional background consisting of in-
stability of the individual's environment; that
such a person has an impulse to carry out the act
and has no control; that he will carry out the act
to completion because he has no control; and that
the EEG tracings arise from the organic cause and
that the emotional factors cause the rage reaction;
that these individuals do not have normal control.
The trial court sustained the state's objections
upon two grounds: (1) The results of the tracing
would be of no probative value except preliminary
to further testimony; and (2) that if the findings
tended to prove that any misconduct of defendant
would be attributable to irresistible impulse rather
than lack of ability to distinguish between right
and wrong, her testimony would not be relevant
9 93 N.W. 2d. 354 (Wis. 1958).
to the issue of insanity, since Wisconsin follows
M'Xaghten. Upon appeal the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held:
1. The results of the EEG tests, standing
alone without other medical testimony, are of
no probative value. The court pointed out that
here there was no medical opinion offered, based
on the EEG, the facts as to defendant's back-
ground and early life, and circumstances of the
alleged offense, as to defendant's mental ca-
pacity or condition at the time of the offense,
defendant then being 17 year's of age.
2. The results of the EEG test, if properly
supported by medical opinion, are admissible
on the issue of insanity even in a M'Naghten
state, if they reasonably tend to show the mental
condition of the defendant at the time of the
offense.
In reaching its conclusions, the court makes no
reference, whatsoever, to any authorities on the
subject.
SUMMARY
On the basis of the cases decided by the appellate
courts to date, we may say with absolute con-
fidence that the EEG, when used to prove or dis-
prove organic brain damage or epilepsy, has passed
the test established by the Frye case. 0 Certainly,
we may say that for this particular purpose the
EEG has "gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field to which it belongs". However, the
EEG, though persuasive, does not ipso facto prove
or disprove organic brain damage or epilepsy and,
by inference, sanity or insanity. The EEG is only
a diagnostic tool used by the medical man to reach
a preliminary conclusion whether there is or is not
organic brain damage or epilepsy, and a final con-
clusion whether the individual is sane or insane.
The observer medical witness must still rely on
his general observation and examination of the
patient, who, as the psychiatrists say, must be con-
sidered as a whole. The pure expert, basing his
conclusions not on observed facts but upon facts
assumed in a hypothetical question, must arrive
at his opinion on the basis of all the evidence per-
tinent to a particular hypothesis, including the
results of an EEG test. In other words, the EEG
can only be interpreted with the aid of case his-
tories and clinical findings.
Moreover, the EEG merely proves that there
was or was not organic brain damage or epilepsy
0 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013,* 1014
(C.C.A., D.C., 1923).
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in the case of a particular individual. Here again
to reach the conclusion or opinion that a particular
individual was sane or insane, the opinion of the
medical man will have to be based on proven case
histories and clinical findings of the individual, in-
cluding the results of the EEG studies. Obviously,
as appears from our study of the English cases, the
findings of the EEG have a very persuasive effect
upon the jury.
We have a more serious legal problem when we
consider the EEG findings to prove or to disprove
a claimed functional psychiatric disorder, as dis-
tinguished from organic brain damage or epilepsy.
The disagreement among the medical authorities
has already been noted and in itself should be
sufficient reason why EEG results as to functional
psychiatric disorders should be excluded, until
such time as such test is generally accepted in the
field. We know that many of our criminals are
psychopaths suffering from afunctional and not an
organic, disorder.5' For this reason alone, the courts
should exclude EEG tests to prove functional dis-
order, until such time as the scientists themselves
can agree on their value in this field. It should be
pointed out that none of the courts has considered
this specific problem.
Assuming that in general an EEG test is ad-
missible, certain preliminary requirements must
be satisfied. The general principles and reliability
of the EEG need not be proved by expert testi-
mony, as the court will take judicial notice of them,
if the view of the New York courts is accepted as
controlling. The test must be identified as being
those of the particular individual involved and
11 See SULTHERLAND, EDwiN H., AND CRESSEY,
DONALD R., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, pp. 117-137
(5th Ed. Lippincott Co., N.Y., 1955).
must be authenticated. Authentication includes
proof that the machine was properly calibrated,
in proper functional order, and manned by compe-
tent operators. A properly trained technician
may make the test and may testify as to the sig-
nificance of the findings. However, a medical man
is still necessary to interpret the findings with refer-
ence to the particular individual involved, as that
is a medical question. A doctor, under whose direc-
tion and supervision an EEG is taken, can authenti-
cate such graphs, without calling the technician.
Under some decisions EEG records made in the
regular course of business are admissible under the
regular entry statute.
It is very apparent, on the basis of past de-
velopments, that the EEG will continue to assume
a dominant role in the trial of criminal cases in
which the issue of insanity is in the picture.
Several questions are raised by this study. There
is an indication in the literature that the EEG is
useful in determining barbitrate intoxication.52
Might not experimental studies be made to deter-
mine whether the EEG could be of help in deter-
mining alcoholic intoxication and whether the
EEG may be used in conjunction with other ma-
chines now in general use in the field, such as the
Harger Drunkometer, the Intoxicometer, the
Alcometer, and the Breathalyzer?
It also seems quite logical to suggest that brain
wave patterns of persons subjected to the standard
lie detection tests now in use should be studied
on an experimental basis to determine whether
there is any correlation between conscious decep-
tion and the form of the brain wave.
12 Note 23, supra.
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